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11
PRUDENCE AND THE LEGISLATIVE ART IN
BOOK II OF ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS
Marc D. Guerra
The failure of contemporary Christian thought sufficiently to acknowledge the
crucial role that prudence plays in political life is a recurring theme in Ernest
Fortin' s writings. Fortin delights in pointing out that even many of the legal
theorists who call for a return to the moral wisdom of Aristotle or Saint Thomas
typically do not share their predecessors' willingness to grant prudence a free scope
of operation in the political world. Fortin recognizes, for example, that in the eyes
of analytic Thomists such as John Finnis and Germain Grisez the AristotelianThomistic reliance on prudential judgments "leaves too much to chance." 1 Dissatisfied with having to wrestle "with excruciatingly difficult prudential decisions,"
these soi-disant Thomists characteristically seek to "replace [such decisions] with
a scheme the successful implementation of which is supposedly less dependent on
the personal judgment of the individual moral agent." 2 But because he remains
unconvinced about either the viability or desirability of such schemes, Fortin
believes that we finally would be better served by trying to recover the classical
understanding of prudence. And in his view, the locus classicus of such an
understanding is Aristotle's Politics. For Fortin, Aristotle's Politics remains
invaluable not simply because it sheds indispensable light on the starting point of
all serious political reflection, but, also, because it provides nothing less than a
complete introduction "to political philosophy tout court." 3
In an effort to help recover this original understanding of prudence, the
following essay examines the relation of prudence and the legislative art as it is
presented in book II of the Politics. As we shall see, Aristotle's argument in this
book not only reveals something about the origins and ends of the legislative art,
but, in discussing the role of prudence in lawmaking, performs the salutary task of
reminding the contemporary reader why law must always, but indispensably,
articulate an imperfect combination of thought and action.
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Book II of Aristotle's Politics stands apart from any other book in the work.
Whereas the previous book investigates the prepolitical origins of political life and
the following books address the dual question of the regime and the best regime,
the second book appears simply to present Aristotle's appraisal of other men's
arguments on the nature of the best regime. Accordingly, chapters two through
eight of book II examine regimes that are "spoken about by certain persons that are
held to be in a fine condition" and chapters nine through eleven consider existing
regimes "that are said to be well managed." 4 The second book of the Politics thus
centers around the theme of thought and action and the proper relation of the one
to the other. 5
Aristotle states at the beginning of book II that it is his "intention to study the
sort of political partnership that is superior to all for those living as far as possible
in the manner one would pray for" (1260b27-29). The remark, at first glance,
seems merely to repeat Aristotle's announcement at the conclusion of book I that
he will investigate next the views others have put forth about the best regime
(1260b25). Closer inspection, however, reveals that the opening remarks of book
I I alter, or perhaps refine, Aristotle's earlier promise. Aristotle presently claims that
he intends to consider the political partnership that is "as far as possible" the best
political arrangement. Instead of offering a speech on the kind of regime that men
can hardly imagine much less put into practice, Aristotle will theorize about
something that men can actually envision as realizable and hence legitimately
request as the object of their prayers. 6
Aristotle continues his discussion of "men who have put forward some view
concerning the regime" (1273b27) in the final chapter of book II. But whereas in
the first eight chapters of book II he spoke of men who "led entirely private lives,"
in the concluding chapter of the book he speaks of men who were "craftsmen of
laws only [or] of a regime as well" (1273b32-33). 7 The twelfth chapter of book II
thus examines the works of men who combined thought and action in law in the
practice of the legislative art. At his best, it will be the wise legislator who, as far
as possible, makes the proper combination of speech and deed explicit in his laws.
The argument of the final chapter of book I I accordingly points back to the chapters
that have preceded it and, by so doing, provides a fitting conclusion to the book as
a whole.
Before examining Aristotle's list of legislators in chapter twelve, it is necessary to review the first eleven chapters of book II. The following account is by no
means intended to provide an exhaustive treatment of chapters two through eleven
of book II of the Politics. Rather, it is designed to recount, in outline form, some
of the examples Aristotle offers in book II of earlier, flawed attempts to combine
thought and action in political life prior to his turning to a discussion of legislators
in the final chapter of the book.
The first six chapters of book II contain Aristotle's analysis of Socratic
political proposals as they are presented in Plato's writings. Chapters two though
five examine the political propositions Plato's Socrates sets forth in the Republic
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and chapter six treats the political propositions outlined in the laws. Aristotle's
criticisms of Socrates in the second book of the Politics primarily focus on the
excessive amount of artificial unity the city in the Republic would impose on
human life. The radical form of communism that marks life within the Republic's
city in speech ignores the natural differences that exist among men and, in so
doing, tyrannically limits the possibilities that nature provides for the development
of human flourishing. For example, Aristotle states that the proposed arrangements
of the city in speech "make the city too much of a unity" and thus "eliminate the
task of two of the virtues, moderation ... and liberality" (1263b9-I I). According
to Aristotle, in the Republic Socrates advocates a kind ofrule that renders impossible the cultivation and practice of virtue as well as participation in political life,
understood as the exchange of rule among free and equal citizens. 8
Aristotle treats the proposals of the laws more favorably than those of the
Republic. Nevertheless, Aristotle observes that by the end of the dialogue the
regime in the laws gradually turns around again to the regime in the Republic
(1265al-4). In contrast to the communistic regime of the Republic, the regime in
the laws allows for the existence of individual households and private property.
To preserve the material conditions needed to sustain both private households and
an appropriate distribution of private property, the legislator in the laws, identified
by Aristotle as Socrates, has fixed the city's number of estates. On the other hand,
he thoughtlessly leaves procreation unrestricted and thus does nothing to control
the number of the citizens (I 265a38). The insufficient attention the legislator pays
to the problems sure to arise by fixing the number of estates and leaving procreation unrestricted inevitably will "cause poverty among the citizens, and poverty
produces factional conflict and crime" (I 265b I I). The regime in the laws therefore differs only outwardly from the regime in the Republic in regard to households
and property: each regime, in effect, does not allow for the genuine existence of
either household life or private property.
Chapters seven and eight of book II discuss proposals that "are closer ... to
established regimes under which [men] are now governed" (1266a33) than are the
political orders limned by Socrates in either the Republic or the laws. The seventh
chapter of book 11 considers the regime advanced by Phaleas. Phaleas thought that
stability could best be brought to the internal life of a city by providing every man
within the city with an equal amount of permanent property. Notwithstanding the
practical problems that would be associated with such a practice, Aristotle argues
that Phaleas's greatest error was his failure to appreciate that men quarrel most over
the unequal distribution of honors and not over the unequal distribution of property. In other words, it is the dangers that arise from the attractions of the soul and
not the needs of the body that most jeopardize the internal stability of a city. As
Aristotle remarks, men do not "commit injustice only because of the necessary
things ... for they might desire merely the enjoyment that comes with pleasures
unaccompanied with pain" (I 267a3-8). Aristotle thus criticizes Phaleas' s materialistic and egalitarian position for naively assuming that the political problem can be
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solved simply by bringing about an equal distribution of material goods among
men. Aristotle accordingly suggests that political life must acknowledge and, as far
as possible, satisfy man's psychic needs, in this case, those for public recognition
and office or rule.
Chapter eight examines the propositions of Hippodamus, a man particularly
prone to abstraction and fond of dividing things into threes, who, Aristotle reports,
"wished to be learned with regard to nature as a whole" ( 1267b29). Aristotle relates
that Hippodamus set forth a series of political proposals in connection with his
account of the best regime. Aristotle devotes the most attention to Hippodamus's
proposal to confer a special type of honor on men who discover things that a city
may find useful. The question of awarding innovations of all kinds raises the
further question of whether it is harmful or advantageous for cities to change their
laws, especially laws that preserve the ancestral. Aristotle observes that men obey
a city's laws not only because the laws are good, but because the laws are their
laws and hence something they have internalized through habituation. He subsequently notes that the frequent alteration of legislation causes men to gain a certain
distance from the laws and thus implies that as a general rule the practice of
changing laws should be avoided. As we shall see though, Aristotle is neither an
advocate of a simple form of political conservatism nor a political philosopher who
reserves the ability to change traditional laws to his own kind. On the contrary, in
the Politics Aristotle points out how prudent legislators can build upon, and hence
must necessarily alter, earlier legislation in their attempt to bring about a better
arrangement of thought and deed in their regimes. 9
While the previous seven chapters had investigated regimes in speech, chapters
nine, ten, and eleven examine the regimes of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage respectively. Each of these regimes is shown to be defective in some major way, thereby
confirming Aristotle's earlier statement that the "regimes now available are in fact
not in a fine condition" (1260b35). Aristotle's deepest criticism of the Spartan
regime concerns its excessive praise of courage or manliness as the goal or purpose
of the political community. As a result of this practice, Sparta has come to mistake·
a necessary, but subordinate, part of virtue for the whole of virtue. The legislator
in Sparta, Aristotle concludes, has formed citizens that excel during wartime, but
who come "to ruin when ... ruling through not knowing how to be at leisure"
(1271b23).
In contrast to Sparta, the Cretan regime enjoys a greater degree of political
stability, e.g., unlike their Spartan counterparts, the Cretan slaves are not rebellious.
Aristotle initially suggests that the lack of political unrest in Crete can be attributed
to the legislation of the city's founder, Minos, who had "philosophized" when
arranging his laws ( 1272a21). ' 0 Through his additional remarks, however, Aristotle
shows how the city's geographical location and the insulation this ~rovides from
foreign disturbances has played no small part in the preservation of political
tranquillity in Crete. Chance more than the work ofa semimythological philosophic
legislator is to be attributed with having kept the city of Crete free from turmoil.
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Aristotle observes that the Carthaginian regime is to be praised for basing a
man's election to office on his claim to excellence as well as to wealth. For, as
Aristotle elsewhere teaches, without such a combination of virtue and equipment
"it is impossible or at least not easy to perform noble actions." 11 The regime in
Carthage therefore possesses a truly aristocratic element. Yet, in the operation of
their regime, the Carthaginians make an error that resembles the one made by the
people of Sparta. As the Spartans mistake a part for the whole of virtue, the
Carthaginians are inclined to take the material preconditions of noble actions for
a sign of the existence of virtue itself. 12 Wealth rather than excellence has become
the true end of political life in Carthage, thus transforming the earlier Carthaginian
aristocracy into an oligarchy.
Aristotle's criticism of previous versions of the best regime is drawn to a close
with the critique of the quasi-aristocratic Carthaginian regime. The most notable
regimes in speech and the most notable regimes in deed fall short of being finely
administered according to the analysis of book II of the Politics. Nevertheless, by
exposing the defects of earlier political proposals, Aristotle has brought to light the
dangers of a political theorizing that abstracts from deeds (for example,
Hippodamus) as well as a political life uninformed by genuine political reflection
(for example, Sparta and Crete).
Let us now turn to an analysis of the final chapter of book II of the Politics.
The first men Aristotle mentions among his list of legislators are Lycurgus and
Solon, each having been an architect of laws as well as ofa regime. Of the eleven
legislators Aristotle refers to in chapter twelve, only Lycurgus and Solon are
explicitly said to have been founders of a regime. 13 Men such as Lycurgus and
Solon set themselves apart from other legislators by possessing both the legislative
and the founding arts. It is thus appropriate that Aristotle begins his discussion of
lawgivers with a reflection on the kind of lawgivers who begin regimes.
Aristotle says relatively little here about Lycurgus, the founder of Sparta, as
either a craftsman of laws or a craftsman of a regime. Aristotle limits himself to
mentioning that some men, who are left unnamed, claim that Lycurgus was a
student of Thales, a philosopher who once made a public demonstration of the
practicality of philosophy (l 259a6-l 8). 14 But, according to Aristotle, this account
of Lycurgus's education runs contrary to available information about the chronological history of these men.
The significance of Aristotle's correction becomes clearer when we recall that
he had spoken of Lycurgus's deeds as a legislator during his consideration of the
Spartan regime in the ninth chapter of book II. Aristotle there suggested that the
institution that at present "holds the [Spartan] regime together," namely, the
democratic Ephorate, owes its existence less to the prescience of Lycurgus's
legislative prudence than it does to the accidents of chance ( l 270b 17-20). Due to
the increased influence the institution of the Ephorate has come to have on the
Spartan regime, the Spartan people have grown satisfied that they currently take
part in the city's greatest office. 15 As a result of the emergence of the democratic
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Ephorate, the Spartan regime has ceased to be an aristocracy and gradually has
become a democracy ( 1270b 16). That Aristotle does not take the particular course
by which the Spartan regime has moved from an aristocracy to a democracy simply
to be good is evidenced by his likening the influence of the Ephorate in Sparta to
the influence of a tyranny (l 270b 14 ).
Aristotle further implies that Lycurgus's legislative skills were defective on
account of his failure to lead the Spartan women to the city's laws, an endeavor that
Aristotle states Lycurgus eventually "gave ... up" ( l 270a8). 16 The distance the
Spartan women maintained from the city's laws allowed them to become licentious
and attached to luxury. Inasmuch as in Sparta the men are "dominated by the
women" ( 1269b24), Lycurgus's failure to bring about the lawfulness of the Spartan
women exposed the regime to being infected with an excessive desire for wealth
as well as a propensity for laxness. Aristotle's account of the defects of the Spartan
regime earlier in book II therefore cast doubts, other than those based on mere
chronology, on the likelihood of Lycurgus having sat and studied at the feet of a
philosopher who knew how to make practical use of philosophic wisdom.
Given the lack of any extended discussion of Lycurgus in the concluding
chapter of book II, Aristotle's detailed analysis of the craftsmen of laws and
regimes in some sense begins with his consideration of Solon. Aristotle's treatment
of Solon far exceeds his discussion of any other man included among the list of
legislators. Indeed, more than a third of the final chapter of book II is devoted to
a consideration of Solon. Aristotle's first words about Solon relate that he is
thought by "some" to have been "an excellent legislator" (1273b35). Solon is
reputed to have put an end to the exclusivity of the earlier Athenian oligarchy and
in so doing to have emancipated the Athenian people. Through these actions, Solon
is said to have "established the traditional democracy" (1273b38), a mixture of the
oligarchic council of the Areopagus, the aristocratic elective offices, and the
democratic law courts. Speaking in his own name, however, Aristotle observes that
Solon's particular, but nevertheless substantial, contribution to the Athenian
constitution consisted in his opening of the law courts to the people, since the
office of the Areopagus and the elective offices existed before Solon's rule. It is
by initiating the practice of populating the law courts out of the citizenry as a whole
that Solon became a craftsman of a regime, according to Aristotle.
On the other hand, Aristotle further notes that it is precisely the political
innovation peculiar to Solon that fuels the claim that he is responsible for the
destruction of the nondemocratic elements of the Athenian regime. This charge
asserts that as the authority of the law courts grew, the democratic institution that
Solon introduced into Athens became something of a tyrant and thus transformed
the older Athenian regime into the present democracy ( 1274a6). In apparent
support of the claim, Aristotle mentions that following Solon's reforms both
Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the influence of the council of the Areopagus, and
Aristotle additionally reports that Pericles established the practice of payment for
serving on the law courts, a custom that promoted demagoguery and hastened the
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coming about of the current form of democracy in Athens (l 274a9-l l ). 17 This
accusation against Solon recalls Aristotle's previous criticism of Lycurgus and his
failure to anticipate and tame Sparta's democratic Ephorate. In each case, an
unfortunate combination of a lack of legislative foresight and chance is said to have
turned the people's unbridled desire for power into a tyrannical force within the
city.
Speaking in his own name again, Aristotle responds to this accusation by
observing that the transformation of Solon's own mixed regime into the current
democratic arrangements of the Athenian regime cannot be attributed to either the
letter or the spirit of Solon's legislation. Both the adaptation of political innovations belonging to men other than Solon, e.g., Pericles and Ephialtes, and the
accidents of chance have contributed to the formation of the present Athenian
democracy. As evidence of this fact, Aristotle recounts that the Athenian people's
assistance in the city's maritime victory over Persia brought them unforeseen and
hence untutored and unrestrained political power. Each of these events, in its own
way, incited political changes within Athens that Aristotle understands to be not in
accord with Solon's intention (1274al3).
Solon's addition of a democratic element into the Athenian regime was rather
restricted: it in fact "granted only the most necessary power to the people," i.e., the
ability to elect men to office and to call them to account if needed (1274al5-16).
Aristotle further remarks that deprived of these limited forms of political participation and responsibility, the people of Athens would have considered themselves
slaves to the regime and would have harbored enmity towards the city. Solon's
prudent proposal to engage the people of Athens in the city's political life is then
a prime example of the principle Aristotle articulates amid his discussion of the
shortcomings of Lycurgus's legislation, namely, that it is necessary for the legislator to ensure that "all the parts of the city ... wish it to exist and continue on the
same basis" ( l 270b20-2 l ).
Aristotle's presentation of Solon in the twelfth chapter of book II in many
ways parallels his treatment of Solon in the Athenian Constitution. At the beginning of that work, Aristotle remarks that Solon "was the first to appear as head of
the people" (AC, 2.3). 18 As the full account of Solon which follows makes clear,
however, Solon is not simply the man he "appears" to be. Aristotle presents Solon
in the Athenian Constitution as the Athenian legislator/statesman par excellence;
it is in this capacity, Aristotle suggests, that Solon is the champion of the people.
Stated differently, Solon's capacity to be a champion of the people rests on his
ability to discern the element of truth in the democrat's claim from a perspective
higher and broader than that of any political partisan, and, insofar as this benefits
the people, Solon can justly be considered their champion.
Early in his consideration of Solon, Aristotle recounts that after Solon had
given his laws he was beset by men "criticizing some points about the laws and
asking questions about others" (AC, 11.1 ). 19 Solon thereupon left Athens and
undertook a ten year journey to Egypt designed to fulfill the dual purpose of
I

l
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"seeing that country" and encouraging the Athenian people to learn how "to carry
out their provisions for themselves" (AC, I I. I ). 20 Solon's Herodotean excursion
forced the people of Athens to live with and govern themselves by their new laws
and not to rely excessively on the judgments of one man, however wise or prudent,
for ongoing political guidance. Solon's self-imposed exile from Athens suggests
that he is perfectly aware of the political reality that men like Hippodamus tend to
overlook, i.e., that men's obedience to law in large measure depends upon their
being habituated to particular laws. Moreover, in creating a situation in which the
Athenians were required to draw near to the city's laws, Solon succeeded in doing
for his people what Lycurgus had failed to do for half of his city's population.
Aristotle thus seems to use the example of Solon to illustrate that at times it is
beneficial for a legislator to force a certain set of circumstances on his regime in
order to attempt to minimize the potentially undesirable effects of chance.
One of the most striking features of Aristotle's treatment of Solon in the
Athenian Constitution is the degree to which Aristotle incorporates Solon's poetry
into his account. By citing Solon's poetry, Aristotle allows his reader to appreciate
that the legislator's thought is marked by a kind of transpartisan reflection that
perhaps borders on the philosophic. In his poems, Solon recollects how he struggled to bring an order of sobriety to the city of Athens that mirrored the order that
existed in his own soul. This task was made all the more difficult because the
Athenians for whom he legislated were "men of unbalanced souls" (AC, I2.4). In
this regard, Solon characterized his life as a legislator as one who "stood at guard
on every side, a wolf at bay among a pack of hounds" (AC, I2.4). As we shall see,
Aristotle's emphasis in the Athenian Constitution on Solon as a legislator who
expresses his thoughts through poetry touches upon a theme present at the heart of
the last chapter in book II of the Politics, namely, the need for legislators to speak
to men's passions as well as to appeal to their sense of what is reasonable.
After concluding his remarks about Solon, Aristotle takes up a discussion of
two tales which offer glimpses into the personal histories of various legislators. In
his comments on the two stories, Aristotle offers a brief, but nevertheless provocative, reflection on the origin and the transferability, both from man to man and from
place to place, of the legislative art.
Aristotle reports as historical fact that Zaleucus and Charondas were both
legislators, the former for the Epizephyrian Locrians and the latter for the Chalcidian cities in Italy and Sicily. 21 Aristotle further remarks that some men, whom he
leaves unnamed, claim that Charondas was a student of Zaleucus. Zaleucus then
is purported to have been a legislator who taught others his distinctive skill. If the
connection between the two men were true, it would imply that the legislative art
is, at least in principle, transferable from legislators to potential legislators. The
question of acquiring the legislative art, in other words, would be a matter of
education as well as chance.
Aristotle, however, denies the alleged connection between Zaleucus and
Charondas on the basis of the historical inaccuracies that mar the tale's account. In
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particular, he doubts the accuracy of what it relays about Zaleucus's and Charondas's education. Prior to being Charondas's teacher, Zaleucus, alone with Lycurgus, is said to have been a student of Thales. But, Aristotle observes, Charondas,
Zaleucus, Thales, and Lycurgus lived at different times; accordingly, those who
speak of a connection between these men do so "without much of an investigation
of chronology" (l 274a30). The question of whether legislators are taught by other
legislators thus does not find its solution in the tale about Zaleucus and Charondas.
In describing the alleged connection between the two aforementioned legislators, Aristotle mentions a Locrian named Onomacritus. At first blush, the reference
to Onomacritus appears simply to be an unnecessary digression, e.g., Onomacritus
is not said to have known either Zaleucus or Charondas. But upon closer inspection, the reference to Onomacritus is far more than a mere digression. Indeed, the
question raised by the account of Onomacritus suggests that Aristotle may recount
the tale about Zaleucus and Charondas in part as a means of introducing the
Locrian into his discussion of legislators.
According to one tradition, Onomacritus is believed to have been the first man
to become skilled in legislation (1274a26). Aristotle relates that Onomacritus is
said to have received legislative training in his adopted home of Crete, a city in
which he practiced the art of soothsaying and associated with the philosopher
Thales ( 1274a26-27). After reporting these four supposedly historical facts
concerning Onomacritus, Aristotle concludes his remarks about the Locrian. While
he will proceed to deny the chronological accuracy of the tale alleging the association of Zaleucus, Charondas, Thales, and Lycurgus that the account of Onomacritus
interrupts, Aristotle noticeably leaves the tradition concerning the first man to
become skilled in the legislative art unchallenged and unqualified.
What are we to make of Aristotle's account of Onomacritus? More sharply,
why does Aristotle seem to go out of his way to include a tale about the first man
to be skilled in legislation in a list that previously had included only men who were
historically recognized as legislators? The solution to these questions is to be found
in the personal description of Onomacritus that Aristotle presents. To begin with,
it should be noted that the first descriptive statement Aristotle offers about
Onomacritus is that he received his instruction in legislation on the island of Crete.
Believed to have originated with Zeus and then to have been transmitted to his son
Minos, the Cretan laws are commonly taken to be the oldest of Greek laws. 22
Onomacritus, Aristotle thus implies, learned the legislative art in a city that is held
to be ruled by the divine laws par excellence. Thus, there seems to be a connection
between the fact that Onomacritus is a soothsayer and the fact that he is said to
have learned about the legislative art in Crete. If the first man to become skilled in
the art of legislation was a diviner, it is not entirely surprising that he would have
received this skill in the city that is renowned for possessing the most ancient and
divine laws.
What is unexpected, however, is the curious statement that Onomacritus is said
to have been a companion of Thales. By noting a connection between the two men,
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Aristotle invites his reader to wonder how Onomacritus's friendship with Thales
contributed to his education in the legislative art. Aristotle thus implicitly raises the
question of the relation of soothsaying and philosophy in the instruction of
Onomacritus and, therewith, of the relation of prophecy and philosophy in the art
of legislation tout court. The answer to this question seems to be that both the art
of divining and philosophy were influences on the first man to become skilled in
the legislative art. In his description of Onomacritus, Aristotle offers a picture of
a man who is neither a mere "soothsayer" nor a pure philosopher, but a diviner who
became skilled in legislation and who was the companion of a philosopher. 23
Accordingly, the legislative art is presented in the final chapter of book II of the
Politics as first emerging in a soothsayer whose horizon of reflection had been
broadened by his association with a philosopher. 24
The man who becomes skilled in legislation then occupies a middle position
between the "one philosophizing in connection with each sort of inquiry" and the
one "merely looking toward action" (1279bl3-14). As a result, he will speak in a
manner that is less exact than the philosopher, but for this reason more suitable to
the kind of universalizing speech that laws need to embody (1282b4-6; NE,
l 137bl2-27) in order to inculcate "true opinion" in citizens (1277b27). 25 To this
end, the legislator may at times incorporate into his laws a form of locution that is
similar to the rhetoric used by the soothsayer. Recourse to preludes that speak of
the designs of the gods or of the city in familial terms aid him in swaying the souls
of the nonphilosophic citizenry into upholding his laws. Such means of persuasion
are intended to moderate and educate the passions of citizens, so that they may
come to appreciate the reasonableness of the city's laws.
The need for such rhetoric, however, implicitly testifies to the imperfection of
the law as law, both in regard to its rationality and in its ability to address each
individual case adequately. 26 The tale about Onomacritus and the nature of the
beginnings of the legislative skill subsequently further elucidates what is implied
in Aristotle's opposition to Hippodamus's proposal to honor innovations, namely,
that laws do not have strength with respect to obedience apart from habit
( l 269a20). By describing Onomacritus as neither a mere soothsayer nor a philosopher, Aristotle's account of the first man to become skilled in legislation serves to
point out that laws are not simply rational and, at the same time, to indicate how
this defect can be addressed by appealing to a form ofreason that is itself informed
by passions. The presentation of Onomacritus, therefore, shows that Aristotle's
criticism of Hippodamus's rationalism does not entail an endorsement of a "theological" position, but rather suggests the possibility and necessity of an alternative
model of political rationalism.
At the conclusion of his treatment of Onomacritus, Aristotle recounts another
tradition, which he similarly does not deny. This tale involves a man named
Philolaus, a Corinthian who gave laws to the Thebans. By not calling into question
the accuracy of the tale, Aristotle tacitly acknowledges that legislators are capable
of transferring their skills from city to city. Aristotle reports that Philolaus is said
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to have been the lover ofDiocles, an Olympic victor who, like Oedipus, was forced
to flee his native Corinth for Thebes upon learning of his mother's incestuous
passions for him ( 1274a34-35). 27 Thus, despite what one learns of the transferability of the legislative art from the tale concerning Philolaus, the lawgiver presumably migrated to Thebes to be with his lover and not to become the city's legislator.
Aristotle further states that Philolaus and Diocles are buried "in full view of one
another," though their tombs face in opposite directions (1274a37-40). While
Diocles's continued disgust with his mother's incestuous desires led him to
position his mound so that Corinth would not be visible to him in death, his lover,
Philolaus, requested that his tomb face his native city.
The tale, which is replete with references to the love of one's own and of
others as well as to what is domestic and what is foreign, seems to have some
bearing on the legislation that Aristotle states is peculiar to Philolaus as a legislator.
Aristotle maintains that Philolaus is known to have given the Thebans laws
pertaining to childbearing. Philolaus's distinctive legislation concerned adoptive
laws that were intended to maintain the number of estates within the city. These
laws were designed to avoid having to divide endlessly the number of lots in
Thebes as a means of counterbalancing the city's steadily increasing population.
Philolaus thus addresses in law a problem that the legislator in the Laws failed to
take seriously. In contrast to the legislator in the laws, Philolaus attempts to curtail
the poverty and crime that will eventually arise from legislators paying insufficient
attention to the problems that result from a fixed number of inheritances and an
increasing civil population. Philolaus's attentiveness to the tensions that plague
cities that do not acknowledge the potential dangers that can rise out of the
household may be due to his own experience with Diocles. In loving a man whose
household suffered from the inability to extend itself to anything outside of its
intended boundaries, Philolaus saw firsthand the temptation of the household to
turn radically in on itself and thus make life, either on the level of the household
or of the city, unlivable. Adoptive laws therefore represent one kind of attempt to
open the household up to the more encompassing life of the city. Whether Philolaus's adoptive laws succeeded in this task, Aristotle does not say.
Whereas the first part of Aristotle's list of legislators referred to the loftiest
activity of the legislator, namely, the founding of a regime, the final section of
chapter twelve acknowledges the need for legislators to concern themselves with
matters involving crimes and punishments. Aristotle, in effect, closes chapter
twelve by conceding that in their attempt to craft laws that aim at living well,
legislators must not lose sight of the sober fact that most men are "swayed not by
a sense of shame but by fear, and refrain from acting basely ... because of the
punishment it brings" (NE, 1179b 10-13). The discussion in the concluding section
of Aristotle's treatment of legislators thus has something of the character of a
descent.
The names of two of the three legislators mentioned in the final section of
chapter twelve, Draco and Androdamas, are associated with the act of homicide,
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the former by virtue of the nature of his punishments, the latter in connection with
his drafting laws about the crime. 28 Aristotle reports that Draco crafted laws for an
existing regime and that the peculiarity associated with his legislation is the
"harshness deriving from the size of the penalties" (1l74bl 7-18). 29 The remark is
striking since prior to the discussion of Draco the principle Aristotle invoked to
distinguish what is particular to a specific legislator had appealed to the kind of
legislation the man enacted. Yet Aristotle sets Draco apart from other legislators
not on the basis of the type of laws he instituted, but due to the kinds of punishments he attached to his laws. This is, in fact, the only instance in chapter twelve
where Aristotle mentions the severity of a legislator's sentences.
Aristotle's presentation of Draco in the final chapter of book II is all the more
striking given that it differs from the account of Draco he offers in the Athenian
Constitution. Aristotle there seems to portray Draco as the political figure who
presided over Athens' transition from something like village life to a closer
approximation of city life (AC, 3,4, and 41 ). The kind of rule Draco would be
expected to exercise then would stand somewhere in between that administered by
the Cyclopes (1252b22-24) and that practiced by the statesman.
Prior to Draco's reign as a legislator, Athens was governed by the ancient
constitution, an arrangement that Aristotle states only "diverged slightly from the
monarchy" that was established when "the tribe-kings were created" (AC, 41.2).
Draco, however, enacted a reform that diminished the influence of the monarchy
by imparting an oligarchic element into the organization of the Athenian ruling
offices and by providing Athens with its first written code of laws (AC, 41.2).
Accordingly, while Draco's punishments were undoubtedly harsh, they may have
been necessary given that at the time of his rule Athens was moving from an
earlier, more barbarous existence to a less crude, if not wholly civilized, political
way of life. Aristotle implies as much in his suggestion that Draco's ordinance
prohibiting homicide constituted a substantial advancement in the adherence to
lawfulness among the Athenians (AC, 7.1 ). 30 It is thus somewhat of a puzzle as to
why Aristotle does not acknowledge Draco as a founder of a regime in the twelfth
chapter of book II of the Politics.
Perhaps Aristotle withholds conferring upon Draco the title of founder in part
because his legislation only acknowledges the requital of evil for evil and not any
of the higher concerns ofjustice, let alone those ofnobility, that distinguish the life
of the city from village life ( l 252b27-30; 1280a3 l-39). In contrast to founders such
as Solon and Lycurgus, Draco did not draft laws with an eye to anything higher
than the establishment and preservation of law and order. If founders are men who
provide codes of law whose positive contents aim at promoting a particular
conception of virtue and the good life, Draco is not a founder since his legislation
performs the primarily negative function of restraining passions and crimes.
Nevertheless, the political history recorded in the Athenian Constitution coupled
with the sketch of the origins of political life offered in book I of the Politics force
one to take seriously the possibility that the circumstances surrounding Draco's
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rule, i.e., the state of the Athenians over which he ruled, called for laws with
dramatically harsh punishments.
Aristotle follows his remarks about Draco with a discussion of the law that is
peculiar to Pittacus. This legislator crafted a law that made drunken men who
committed offenses pay a greater penalty than those who committed the same
offenses while sober. By recognizing that men are more inclined to commit
outrages when intoxicated, Pittacus looked not at the drunkard's excuse, but to
what is advantageous (1274b23).
Legislators like Pittacus seem to understand that lawgivers cannot focus
exclusively on what men do: they must also pay attention to why men act as they
do. External or internal factors, or a combination of the two, as in the case of
drunkenness-either by wine or by other intoxicants such as philosophy-may
cause men to act in ways they normally would not. Legislators must therefore
attempt to address this problem by institutionalizing in their laws means of
addressing the causes that incite men to transgress the law. Ironically, however, the
last word on Pittacus in the Politics, namely, that he is popularly remembered in
drinking songs, suggests that the likelihood of a legislator overcoming this problem
depends less on the expediency of his legislation than it does on the powers of
attraction possessed by those things that incline men to forget what the laws
command and prohibit (1285a36-37).
In light of the preceding analysis of Aristotle's list of legislators and its
relation to the second book's teaching on the themes of thought and action, a few
additional observations are in order. Amid his discussion of men who have
attempted prudently to bring speech and deed together in law, Aristotle refers to
Plato and Phaleas (1274b6-14), but fails to mention either Hippodamus or the
legislation he proposed. Plato and Phaleas accordingly appear to receive a greater
hearing in the concluding chapter of book II than does Hippodamus. By cataloguing pieces of legislation that are peculiar to individual legislators, however,
Aristotle tacitly acknowledges a partial truth contained in Hippodamus's most
notable legislative proposal. Aristotle's list of legislators in some sense honors,
albeit in a nuanced form, the innovation that is peculiar to the man who champions
honoring all innovations. Perhaps by this Aristotle means to suggest that, if
circumstances allow, men should attempt "to honor" useful innovations in legislation, but that honor in such cases takes the form of prudently and discreetly
adopting the innovation in practice rather than imprudently celebrating the innovator and his innovation. Aristotle thus seems to provide a model for approaching the
problem of altering laws that charts a middle course between the kind of rationalistic progressivism espoused by Hippodamus and the sacrosanct traditionalism
heralded by Lycurgus. Stated differently, the teaching Aristotle here presents about
carrying out prudential changes in the laws articulates an appreciation of the city
as a political partnership that is at the same time less rationalistic and less theological than that offered by either Hippodamus or Lycurgus respectively.
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It further should be observed that the important question Aristotle leaves
unresolved in discussing the alleged connection between Zaleucus and Charondas,
namely, whether men can teach other men expertise in legislation, does find one
kind of response in book II of the Politics. While Aristotle concludes that legend
has not established that men are capable of instructing other men in the legislative
art, the argument of the second book itself suggests that the question must be
answered in the affirmative. By discussing regimes in speech and regimes in deed,
as well as by considering the aims and origins of the legislative art, Aristotle casts
himself in the role of the teacher of legislators. Accordingly, as it is presented in
the second book of the Politics, an Aristotelian education in the prudential dimensions of legislating provides one possible alternative to chance in the formation of
a legislator.
Moreover, by presenting a teaching that is, at least in principle, accessible to
legislators and to potential legislators, Aristotle not only shows what type of man
is the true teacher of legislators, but, also, indicates the full extent to which the
legislative art is transferable. In contrast to the partial and particular legislative skill
held by prudent men like Philo taus, i.e., actual legislators who wed their legislative
skills to individual cities and their individual concerns, the universality of the kind
of knowledge of legislation Aristotle possesses allows him to transfer this knowledge indefinitely to countless cities through his political writings (1297b35-38; NE,
1180a33). In this respect, the paradigmatic example of prudently bringing speech
and deed together "as far as possible" finds its fullest expression not in the actions
of the legislator or of the founder but in a certain dimension, or appreciation, of the
prudential activity that is peculiar to Aristotle in his distinctive role as political
philosopher.
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about Pericles and his further democratization of the law courts in the Politics, one should
note that careful study of the Athenian Constitution reveals that the political health of
democratic Athens depends in large part upon the conditions surrounding the organization
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I 8. Connected with Solon's title as ''head of the people" is the fact that Aristotle states
that he was of high birth but of moderate wealth. See, in addition, Politics, 1296al 6-21;
however. note its immediate context.
19. In describing the character of these encounters, Aristotle presents Solon as an
umpire mediating between the claims of the oligarchs and the people. Aristotle states that
the people expected Solon's reforms to redistribute all property whereas the oligarchs
expected his reforms simply to change all outward appearances of injustice. See, in
particular, AC, 5. 1. Along similar lines, see Aristotle's comparison of Solon's and Phaleas's
proposals for property reform in Politics 1266b 14- 18.
20. Solon's calculated attempt to have the Athenians learn to govern themselves by
law stands in contrast to Lycurgus's charge to the people of Sparta to leave his laws
unchanged in perpetuity. As Aristotle presents him, Solon's intention is less to move the
people to the rule of his law as it is to rule of good laws simply. The founding of Sparta
under Lycurgus thus has more of a personal element attached to it than does the founding
of Athens under Solon. The difference between the two men's approaches to the founding
ofa city perhaps best can be seen in Lycurgus's death. Lycurgus's suicide gave the founding
of Sparta a kind of theological dimension not present in Solon's founding of Athens. See
Plutarch, "Lycurgus," 78-79. In short, the actions of Lycurgus, more than those of Solon, fit
the description of the legislator outlined in book II, chapter seven of Rousseau's Social
Contract.
21. Aristotle says nothing about the legislative activities of Zaleucus in chapter twelve
of book II. Of Charondas, Aristotle provisionally states that there is nothing peculiar about
his legislation (1274b4). He immediately adds, however, that Charondas was the first to
introduce denunciation for cases involving perjury ( 1274b5). There is thus literally
something peculiar to Charondas's legislation but evidently not peculiar enough for Aristotle
to acknowledge its distinctiveness. Aristotle's account ofCharondas as a legislator is further
complicated by the fact that he notes that Charondas's laws were more precise and more
polished in their expression than those of"current legislators" (1274b7-8). Whatever is to
be made of Aristotle's admittedly perplexing treatment ofCharondas, it is clear that he uses
the example of Charondas to relate that the legislative art does not necessarily become more
refined simply by the passage of time.
22. See, for example, Homer, Iliad, 13.450 and Plato, Laws, 624a-632d.
23. Aristotle's account ofOnomacritus thus in some ways foreshadows the medieval
Islamic teaching on the Imam. See Alfarabi, The Attainment ofHappiness, 1.57-58. It should
be noted, however, that the Politics seems to have been unavailable to the medieval Islamic
philosophers. See Averroes, Commentary on Plato's Republic, 1.8. Despite the surface
similarities between Aristotle's presentation ofOnomacritus and the Islamic teaching on the
Imam, there are substantial differences between the two. Whereas the Imam is said to be
perfect as a prophet, philosopher, lawgiver, and founder, Onomacritus's claim to perfection
in any of these offices is questionable at best: Aristotle fails to state that Onomacritus
actually gave laws and in no way implies that he is a founder. As to Onomacritus's skill as
a diviner, see Herodotus, The History, 7.6.
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24. In contrast, Bartlett argues that in the example ofOnomacritus Aristotle asks "does
the expertise in political affairs and, above all, the science of the founding of the best city,
rely on knowledge accessible to the unassisted human mind or on superhuman inspiration?
Does it owe its origins to 'Thales' or 'Onomacritus' (philosophy or prophecy, human reason
or the gods)" ("Aristotle's Science," 144). Bartlett here radicalizes alternatives in a way that
Aristotle's text does not. Clearly the question of what source, i.e., unaided human reason or
superhuman inspiration, should inform man's political life is of the utmost importance. But
Bartlett's formulation seems to transform the question of what are the origins of legislative
skill into the question of what is the best way of life simply. Stated differently, Bartlett here
introduces the question of what way of life is better, the philosophic or the religious-a
question to which Aristotle would undoubtedly affirm the former, into the text at a point
where Aristotle appears to be suggesting that the art practiced by actual legislators is neither
simply prophetic nor simply philosophic, but a confused mixture of the two.
25. Aristotle in fact subtly states that the legislator qua legislator also operates on the
level of true opinion. Compare Aristotle's argument in NE, 1141b23-1142b40 with his
statement about the political philosopher being the architect of the end by which something
is called either good or bad unconditionally in NE, 1152b 1-4. See my "Aristotle on Pleasure
and Political Philosophy: A Study in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics," Interpretation:
A Journal of Political Philosophy 24, no. 2 (Winter 1997): 172.
26. Along similar lines, see Aristotle's treatment of equity as a necessary corrective
for the inadequacies of legal justice in NE, 1l370a-1l38b.
27. For a discussion of the possible import of Diodes' resemblance to Oedipus, see
Nichols, Socrates and the Political Community, 173.
28. In chapter twelve, Aristotle simply states that Androdamas gave laws about
homicide and heiresses to the Chalcidians of Thrace. Apart from the report of Androdamas
given here, nothing else is known of him.
29. Plutarch observes that Draco's laws "were too severe, and the punishment too
great; for death was appointed for almost all offenses, inasmuch that even those who were
convicted of idleness were to die; and those that stole a cabbage or an apple were made to
suffer just as villains that committed sacrilege or murder ... and he himself, being once
asked why he made death the punishment of most offenses, replied, 'Small ones deserve that,
and I have no higher for the greater crimes"' (Plutarch, vol. 1, ''Solon," 117).
30. Aristotle relates this observation amid his description of Solon's actions as a
legislator. Aristotle there seems to go out of his way to state that Solon replaced all of
Draco's laws with the sole exception of his prohibition against homicide. Aristotle thus
appears to be intimating that even founders such as Solon do not establish entirely new
modes and orders.

